Centre for Philosophical Studies of History

22/10/2026

Today in a week (29.10, 10h/11h, Central European/Finnish time), Aidan Ryall will give the talk “The Historical Premise: The Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Philosophy of History” in our research seminar. For more info and the Zoom link, please see here: https://www.oulu.fi/en/events/historical-premise-pessimistic-meta-induction-and-philosophy-history.

All welcome!

Abstract

The pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) is regarded as one of the most successful arguments against scientific realism. It is an inductive argument which moves from the observation that many empirically successful scientific theories have later been disproved, to the conclusion that our best current scientific theories are likely false. The argument rests on a historical premise: the claim that there are sufficiently many such successful but false scientific theories in history. Here I challenge the viability of the historical premise in debates about the metaphysical status of science. When relying on the historical premise, the scientific anti-realist must adopt either historical realism or anti-realism. If they adopt historical realism, then the historical premise and the conclusion of the PMI cannot both be true. Conversely, if they adopt historical anti-realism, then the induction fails. Thus, we cannot use the PMI to conclude that scientific anti-realism is true. In doing so, I show that our common understanding of observability does not straightforwardly apply to intellectual history, and how this complicates debates about realism in the philosophy of history

16/10/2026

In about two weeks, Aidan Ryall (Australian National University) will give the talk "The Historical Premise: The Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Philosophy of History" in our joint research seminar PHO2. Save the date, and more information soon!

14/10/2026

Do you already know about the autumn edition of our joint research seminar PHO2? Our next session, in just over two weeks, features Aidan Ryall on "The Historical Premise: The Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Philosophy of History". The rest of the lineup is stellar too. Come and join us!

25/09/2026

New video on our Youtube channel! Watch the talk "Naturalism, History, and the Philosophy of the Science" that Luke O'Sullivan gave in our joint research seminar here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PKdR5W5izTE.

Happy watching!

On 24.09.2026, Luke O’Sullivan (National University of Singapore, S...

23/09/2026

A final, friendly reminder: Tomorrow (24.09, 14/15h, Central-European/Finnish time), Luke O’Sullivan will give the talk "Naturalism, History, and the Philosophy of the Science" in our joint research seminar PHO2. See here for more information and the Zoom link: https://www.oulu.fi/en/events/naturalism-history-and-philosophy-science.

All welcome!

Abstract
Naturalism as a philosophical viewpoint has come to be identified with a commitment to the superiority of the scientific perspective as a way and a means of knowing the world. In contemporary analytical philosophy, W.V.O. Quine has been the thinker most closely associated with the demand to establish all genuine knowledge as empirical and scientific in nature, treating both common sense and philosophy as continuous with scientific thought. But Quine did not address the problem of what to do with humanistic disciplines like history, and with the social sciences. Attempts to reduce the logic of history and social science to natural-scientific terms have generally been unsuccessful, because the natural sciences, especially if we take physics as a model, cannot incorporate the intentions, meanings, actions, and events which are the objects of the humanities and social sciences. There is, however, an older and broader sense of naturalism which has been generating renewed interest, associated with thinkers like George Santayana and Ernst Cassirer. Santayana and Cassirer both argue for the existence of an irreducible plurality of perspectives from which we may gain knowledge of reality. In their accounts, each of these symbolic perspectives has its own distinctive explanatory structure, allowing history and the social sciences to sit alongside rather than being subsumed under natural science. The advantage of adopting this view is that it can correct Quine's overly narrow view of naturalism, which is enlarged to make room for extra-empirical components of knowledge without returning to the kinds of transcendental, supernatural, and metaphysical ideas that Quine was rightly suspicious of.

Naturalism, History, and the Philosophy of the Science

18/09/2026

Thursday next week (24.09, 14h/15h, Central-European/Finnish time), Luke O’Sullivan will give the talk “Naturalism, History, and the Philosophy of the Science” in our joint research seminar PHO2. For the abstract and the Zoom-link, please see here: https://www.oulu.fi/en/events/naturalism-history-and-philosophy-science.

All welcome!

Abstract
Naturalism as a philosophical viewpoint has come to be identified with a commitment to the superiority of the scientific perspective as a way and a means of knowing the world. In contemporary analytical philosophy, W.V.O. Quine has been the thinker most closely associated with the demand to establish all genuine knowledge as empirical and scientific in nature, treating both common sense and philosophy as continuous with scientific thought. But Quine did not address the problem of what to do with humanistic disciplines like history, and with the social sciences. Attempts to reduce the logic of history and social science to natural-scientific terms have generally been unsuccessful, because the natural sciences, especially if we take physics as a model, cannot incorporate the intentions, meanings, actions, and events which are the objects of the humanities and social sciences. There is, however, an older and broader sense of naturalism which has been generating renewed interest, associated with thinkers like George Santayana and Ernst Cassirer. Santayana and Cassirer both argue for the existence of an irreducible plurality of perspectives from which we may gain knowledge of reality. In their accounts, each of these symbolic perspectives has its own distinctive explanatory structure, allowing history and the social sciences to sit alongside rather than being subsumed under natural science. The advantage of adopting this view is that it can correct Quine's overly narrow view of naturalism, which is enlarged to make room for extra-empirical components of knowledge without returning to the kinds of transcendental, supernatural, and metaphysical ideas that Quine was rightly suspicious of.

10/09/2026

Today in two weeks (24.09), the autumn edition of our joint research seminar PHO2 will begin with Luke O'Sullivan (National University of Singapore) speaking about "Naturalism, History, and the Philosophy of the Science". All welcome, and save the date!

There will be more info on this event and the whole seminar programme soon. Stay tuned!

11/08/2026

Check out the call for papers for the conference "Learning from History: The Philosophies of Historiography and the Historical Sciences" that will be organized by our sister organization The Foundation for the Philosophy of Historical Sciences and Historiography at the University of Ostrava in late November: https://philevents.org/event/show/150505. The submission deadline for abstracts is August 31st, plus the Centre's director Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen will be one of the keynote speakers.

Call for Papers: Learning from History: The Philosophies of Historiography and the Historical Sciences The University of Ostrava, Czech Republic, 27-29 November 2026 Confirmed keynote speakers (alphabetically): Carol Cleland Adrian Currie Michal Hubálek Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen James McAllister....

24/06/2026

New video on our Youtube channel! Watch the talk "After First Philosophy: The Case of Historical Knowledge" that Michal Hubálek (University of Hradec Kralove) gave in our joint research seminar PHO2 here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3b7livUuZok.

Happy watching!

On 22.06.2026, Michal Hubálek (University of Hradec Králové, Czechi...

19/06/2026

A final, friendly reminder: Next Monday (22.06), Michal Hubálek will give the talk After First Philosophy: The Case of Historical Knowledge in our joint research seminar PHO2. Please see here for more information and Zoom link: https://www.oulu.fi/en/events/after-first-philosophy-case-historical-knowledge.

Please note that the talk will take place at 15h Central European and 16h Finnish time.

All welcome!

Abstract
Naturalism is certainly one of those “isms” that collapses under the weight of its own popularity. My book Dissolving Naturalism and Historicism Into Each Other (2025) can be read as a long argument for an ecumenical and non-scientistic version of naturalism. Such naturalism, as I understand it, does not need a qualifying adjective: it is not a local doctrine, but a methodologically and metaphysically opportunistic meta-theoretical stance. In my talk, I will ask what follows from this view for historical writing and historical knowledge. I will do so chiefly by engaging with W. V. O. Quine and Paul A. Roth, two figures who, each in their own way, make it possible to think naturalism and historicism not as rivals, but as mutually entangled orientations. Against the background of the arguments developed in my book, I will address some of the questions that currently animate philosophy of history, while also suggesting possible new orientations for future inquiry.

After First Philosophy: The Case of Historical Knowledge